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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 30-40

OCTOBER 1962

COMMUNIST
TERRILLA
CTICS



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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
FOREWORD

1. Guerrilla warfare has been waged in many parts of the world for centuries. In recent years, this form of combat has been refined and resolutely applied by the Communists to advance their interests in many parts of the world.

2. The principles and procedures set forth in this pamphlet have been used by Communists or by forces under Communist control with varying degrees of success. Subject to local modification, the factors described are considered fundamental to Communist doctrine.

3. A partial bibliography of unclassified books on Communist guerrilla warfare is included as an appendix.

4. Maximum dissemination of this pamphlet for training purposes is recommended. Troops preparing for guerrilla and counter guerrilla combat operations should be encouraged to utilize the material.



"The capability to conduct guerrilla and counterguerrilla campaigns successfully is essential to our national security, for this form of conflict seems more likely today than either nuclear or large-scale conventional warfare."

GENERAL GEORGE H. DECKER
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

"It is historically inaccurate and psychologically dangerous to think that these men [Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara] created the strategy and tactics of guerrilla war to which we are now responding. Guerrilla warfare is not a form of military and psychological magic created by the Communists. There is no rule or parable in the Communist texts which was not known at an earlier time in history."

WALT W. ROSTOW
*Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Staff,
U.S. Department of State.*

PAMPHLET
No. 30-40

**HEADQUARTERS,
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C., 1 October 1962

COMMUNIST GUERRILLA TACTICS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Section I. GENERAL

1. Purpose

a. This pamphlet is intended to acquaint U.S. military personnel with the doctrine for guerrilla warfare* that is set forth in Communist source materials. Such doctrine is based on an intensive study of the general subject by the Communists. It also draws on their experiences in the actual conduct of guerrilla warfare at various times and under varying circumstances. The description should be of use in training troops who may face Communist-led or Communist-supported guerrillas anywhere in the world.

b. There is nothing essentially unique about Communist guerrilla doctrine. The description herein, however, reflects the thoroughness of the Communist approach. It points up the careful attention given to political considerations and to the continued control of all phases of guerrilla operations undertaken by forces operating in the Communist interest. Those aspects of guerrilla warfare to which the Communists give special emphasis, and in which forces led by them will be especially adept, are stressed.

2. Scope

The text discusses Communist guerrilla warfare

* Often variously referred to as partisan warfare, irregular warfare, or, as a special category, insurrectionary warfare.

doctrine that would be employed under differing conditions, for whatever purpose. A description is included of preparatory measures, means employed to gain popular support for the guerrilla cause, and standard organizational and control procedures. The ways in which basic concepts of guerrilla combat may be modified to meet particular local conditions are delineated. The text includes separate chapters on related intelligence, subversive, and psychological operations and on guerrilla-like operations in cities, not normally considered a part of true guerrilla operations.

Section II. GUERRILLA WARFARE

3. General

a. Guerrilla warfare is a historic form of armed combat. Although the range of this activity is broad, it has definite limits. At one extreme, it merges with conventional military operations; at the other, with uncoordinated, spontaneous, individual acts of sabotage, subversion, or terrorism.

b. Guerrilla warfare normally employs quasi-military or irregular forces behind the lines or along the flanks of an enemy's regular troops. In addition to actual military operations, guerrilla warfare embraces such activities as sabotage, terrorism, passive resistance, and propaganda, when carried on in an organized fashion. Guerrilla warriors are not impelled to face death or prolonged hardship in the same sense as are trained and uniformed regular troops. The latter possess a special discipline, esprit, and pride in the profession

of arms. The guerrilla acts almost entirely out of subjective devotion to a cause, although sometimes he will be subjected to varying forms and degrees of duress.

c. Guerrilla operations are most likely and most effective when the enemy presents numerous potential targets: Supply bases, isolated garrisons and military installations, extended lines of communication. Such operations depend heavily on a friendly local populace, natural cover, and ultimate sources of continued supply, either internal or external.

d. Guerrilla forces are organized into relatively small basic units. These may be widely dispersed, but are held under some form of central direction and control. They are equipped, as a rule, with light infantry weapons and explosives. They also employ various other appropriate items that may be acquired in the actual area of operations: Machetes, knives, rope, wire, clubs, sporting rifles, shotguns, etc. When in action, the units attempt to be independent in a logistic sense, and to "live off the land" to the greatest possible extent.

e. Guerrillas normally are drawn from the local population. They may spend a good portion of their time in regular civilian pursuits, while conducting operations at night or for relatively brief periods of a few days or weeks at a time.

f. Economy of force is stressed in guerrilla operations. Tactical units seek to avoid a direct confrontation with enemy forces. Hit-and-run tactics are the rule. When a pitched battle occurs, the guerrilla force will seek to disengage and re-

treat into the countryside at the earliest practicable moment.

g. Colonel T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), one of the great practitioners of this type of warfare during World War I, said of his "Arabian Army" that "tactically it must develop a highly mobile, highly equipped type of force, of the smallest size, and use it successively at distributed points of the Turkish line, to make the Turks reinforce their occupying posts beyond the economic minimum of 20 men. The power of this striking force would not be reckoned merely by its strength. The ratio between number and area determined the character of the war, and by having five times the mobility of the Turks the Arabs could be on equal terms with them with one-fifth their number."

h. Lawrence likened his guerrilla operations to naval warfare "in their mobility, ubiquity, their independence of bases and communications, in their ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points." Quoting a naval commentator that "He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will," Lawrence adds, "he who commands the desert is equally fortunate." The same can be said, of course, for other likely areas for guerrilla operations. These include jungles, mountains, forests, or marshes.

i. Built-up areas and open country with a relatively high population density are not favorable for guerrilla activity. In these areas, conventional forces are not handicapped—as they are elsewhere

—by their dependence on roads and railroads, communications, logistics, base facilities, and cross-country mobility of mechanized equipment.

4. Popular Support

Guerrilla units are drawn from the local populace and remain in a close relationship with it. The residents of the area can support them in many ways. They can provide information about the local terrain, intelligence about enemy troops and installations, food, shelter, weapons and equipment, hiding places, and similar items. If a significant proportion of the local population is actively opposed to them, guerrilla forces have little chance of success.

5. Objectives

a. The factor that gives force and unity to guerrilla operations, and that sustains the loyalty of the local populace, is a mutual goal. Particularly desirable are goals that possess a high emotional appeal. These may be the overthrow of colonial rule, the ouster of a ruling tyrant, the expulsion of an enemy occupation force, or the establishment of a regime more in accordance with the aspirations of the people.

b. The diversity of goals which guerrilla operations seek can be shown by random historical examples: Francis Marion, "the Swamp Fox," made a substantial contribution to the American Revolutionary War against a colonial power, Great Britain; Col. John S. Mosby supported the South's effort to gain its independence from the United States; the Spanish guerrillas greatly weakened

Napoleon's hold over their territory and gave a popular name (literally, in Spanish, "little war") to this kind of warfare; Lawrence of Arabia helped to lead the Arabs in a national revolt during World War I against their centuries-long overlords, the Turks; in World War II, guerrilla forces resisted Axis occupation forces in the Philippines, China, Yugoslavia, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, the U.S.S.R., Albania, Poland, and other countries.

6. Relation to Conventional Forces

a. In virtually all these and other instances, the guerrilla operations were in some degree coordinated with those of regular military forces, either inside or outside the country. Their experience generally bears out the maxim that guerrilla operations are more effective when reciprocal support of regular troops is possible. Guerrillas by themselves have never won wars, but their contributions frequently have permitted conventional forces to succeed.

b. The importance of the relationship with conventional forces has given guerrilla warfare a rate of growing prominence in recent decades. This is the era of total war, when the concept of "the nation in arms" is popular. Throughout much of previous history, regular armies were seen as the "playthings of royalty," and were often wholly mercenary. There was little identity of interest between them and the general populace, a critical factor in generating and sustaining guerrilla operations.

7. Current Aspects

The incidence of guerrilla warfare, in support of popular objectives and involving one or more of the great powers, may increase in the years ahead. In the less well developed countries, geography and other factors combine to make guerrilla war the most likely means of pursuing such increasingly intense aspirations as those for social justice, equitable economic distribution, or political representation.

8. Role of Communist Leadership

a. The Communist leadership has not always shown great interest in encouraging insurrectionary movements and in supporting guerrilla warfare waged in behalf of these movements. The hesitancy of Soviet leaders to support popular uprisings in the past was partly attributable to limitations on Soviet capabilities. They also were faced with overriding concern with internal developments and difficulties with the European great powers and Japan. Another, and perhaps an even more important reason, however, was a Soviet unwillingness to support movements which they could not control and which aimed at other than purely Communist objectives.

b. In recent years, the Soviet leaders have decided to support virtually all popular insurrectionary movements outside the Communist Bloc. In certain areas, they will find conditions favorable for the instigation of true Communist revolutions. More frequently, however, they will seek to gain control and shape the ultimate objectives of vari-

ous other kinds of popular uprisings. They are restricted only by their capabilities, the opportunities afforded them by the movement's local leaders, and by the prospects for success. In part, they seek in this way to reduce the strength of the West and to extend their own influence in various parts of the world. The ideological justification of their decision is that any such conflict will result in a new politico-economic situation. In accordance with the Marxist dialectic, regardless of what the new situation is, it will necessarily be one step nearer the final goal, communism.

c. The Soviets attach great importance to the political and propaganda advantages that support of insurrectionary movements provides, even if they are unable to gain control of them. It is particularly true where they can be cast in the role of supporting anticolonial uprisings, rebellions against tyrannical rule, or efforts to gain social justice and a fairer distribution of the national wealth.

d. The Communists also have established plans for organizing and directing popular insurrections. These plans are broad in scope to account for the varying degrees of control which Communist agents or supporters can exert in particular situations. The Communists also have developed specific tactical doctrine to govern the actual conduct of guerrilla operations. These plans and tactical procedures, drawn from Soviet and other Communist sources, are described in detail in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

COMMUNIST POLITICAL CONTROL AND ORGANIZATION

Section I. SOVIET AGENCIES

9. Covert Operations

A number of Soviet governmental and Communist Party agencies—which have their counterparts in other Communist countries—are involved in efforts to instigate, support, or, if necessary, gain control of uprisings in foreign countries. Among those agencies engaged in covert operations are the Foreign Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

10. Overt Operations

Other agencies are also involved in a more open fashion, from time to time, as appropriate. For example, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, through its diplomatic staffs abroad, maintains a close watch over and in various ways seeks to influence local political developments. The Defense Ministry provides equipment and supplies, advisers, and other forms of military assistance. Also, any of various economic and scientific ministries in Moscow provide financial, material, and technical support.

11. Procedures

Within the country itself, Soviet representatives assist in recruiting and indoctrinating indigenous personnel. They provide for the political and military training of selected activists, and arrange




Figure 1. Soviet chain of control and/or supply of national Party organizations.

for the necessary logistic support from outside. The Soviet readiness to provide assistance, the dependence of the local dissidents upon that assistance, and Soviet-directed propaganda and subversive efforts usually open the way to focusing the movement's objectives in directions favorable to Soviet interests. Thus a true, democratic national movement may be gradually diverted into one serving purely Communist interests, even when this shift is to the detriment of the movement's original purposes. Such a shift in objective does not always come about, but, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, the Soviets do not necessarily withdraw their support of the movement on that account.

Section II. LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES

12. Role

The existence of a strong local Party organization facilitates Soviet or other Communist powers' efforts to initiate or take control of a revolutionary movement. The existence of significantly disposed Communist cadres in Cuba, for example, was decisive in determining the course of the movement. Communist leaders do not always play a leading role. They may work in the background until they are reasonably certain they can take control of the movement. Regardless of the presence or absence of Soviet agents or advisers, the local Party leaders are always natives. Further, they will tend to stress national, rather than international, Communist goals in any public appeal or declaration.

13. Organization

The Communist Party apparatus, if not yet in control, will remain under cover. Its organization seeks to parallel that within the movement itself. Coordination will be effected, if practicable, by personnel from the various levels of the Party organization serving overtly or covertly at comparable levels in the movement organization. The lowest basic Communist unit is the cell. Efforts are made to establish at least one cell in every village, city block, factory, installation, and military unit.

14. Procedures

Party members work to gain influence over non-members. They seek to increase popular support of Party objectives as laid down by the local (or Soviet) leaders. Their efforts are directed particularly toward the workers, youth, peasants, intelligentsia, and lower middle class. They penetrate such groups and seek to gain influence or leadership over them. The extension of Party influence over the masses operates somewhat in the manner of a machine run by gears: Inner-circle Party units activate fringe groups, who in turn influence sympathizers, who in turn execute, or help cause still others to execute, the desired action.

Section III. MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

15. Preparation

The Communists organize and train selected personnel to assume military control of an up-

rising and to direct its operations. Such persons need not be Party members, but they must be responsive to Communist objectives. They may be encouraged to join a regular military establishment to subvert it or to neutralize its effectiveness. Alternatively, they may be retained as part of a cadre secret military organization. In such a case, they are prepared to step in as soon as an uprising has commenced and to assume control of its combat elements.

16. Reasons for Success

a. Groups other than the Communists, as a rule, lack the foresight or determination to prepare such cadres in advance. As a result, their leadership is at a great disadvantage in comparison with the Communists in any competition for control over the insurgent military forces. They lack the training, discipline, established organization, and firm outside support available to the Communists.

b. In the initial stages of an uprising, moreover, guerrilla bands form spontaneously from among such groups as peasants, loyalist deserters, and outlaw elements. Generally, these bands are weak, poorly led, and have poorly defined goals. Party elements, with their effective organizational structure, experienced leadership, and clear objectives, tend to attract and gain control of such groups. The process of their absorption is accelerated by penetration of the groups by Party activists.

c. The Communists further benefit from the fact that many persons who are highly motivated




Figure 2. Typical national Communist Party military organization.

against the regime or occupying power will join the movement. Such persons will follow any insurrectionary leadership unquestioningly. They do not aspire to leadership themselves and usually will readily transfer their enthusiasm for insurrection into devotion to the movement's leaders, of whatever political stripe.

d. Willingness of the U.S.S.R. or other Communist states to provide material support also facilitates the local Communist leadership in its efforts to acquire control of the insurrectionary movement. The procurement of weapons, explosives, and other equipment before and during an uprising is essential for its success. If such material is acquired, stored, and distributed by local Communist groups, it is almost certain that Communist control of the movement will develop.

17. Organization

The forces themselves are organized much like regular military forces. Organizational procedures are not nearly so precise, however, and the size and equipment of guerrilla units will vary widely. Efforts are made to avoid having fewer than 3 or more than 5 subordinates reporting to any single commander. The basic combat unit usually is the platoon, consisting of several tightly knit squads. Platoons will contain about 30 to 40 men, formed into companies of 100 to 150 men. Such units have no fixed composition. Usually, only units larger than companies contain regular service elements, coordinating staffs, and comprehensive communications systems. In fact, such




Figure 3. Typical organization of a Communist-led guerrilla company.

organizational refinements may await transformation of the guerrilla force into a conventional one.

18. Role of Party Members

a. Actual Party members normally constitute only a fraction of a combat unit's strength. They will serve at even the lowest levels, however, and

do not hesitate to participate directly in hazardous combat actions.

b. The Party organization is represented by committees at higher echelons and by cells in the lower units. Secret counterintelligence agents are used to penetrate the entire structure of the guerrilla force.

c. When the Communists are in effective control of guerrilla forces, they establish a system of political officers within the combat units. This procedure compares closely with that in regular Communist Armed Forces. Political officers serve as agents of the Party's political apparatus. They seek to insure the conformance of training procedures and combat operations to Party doctrine. They also provide political indoctrination and "cultural" education for the troops. They report through higher headquarters on local conditions affecting the Party's situation and possible requirements for new definitions of Party doctrine. Political officers also may be active as propagandists within local citizens' groups and perform various intelligence and counterintelligence functions for the Party.




Figure 4. Typical national Communist organization for penetration of Armed Forces.

CHAPTER 3

PREPARATIONS FOR GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

19. General

Communists consider that careful preparations, as well as a firm organization, are essential to the success of guerrilla warfare. Various practical rules are adhered to in insuring that the proper groundwork is laid.

20. Funds and Equipment

a. Effective material support is recognized as essential to any insurrectionary movement. Funds may be acquired from subsidies by Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, contributions from local supporters, extortion, expropriation, or outright theft. Military equipment is obtained by overt or covert shipments from the Bloc, purchases on the open market, purchases on the "black market" or from corrupt loyalist troops, local production, and seizure of arms stores. For guerrilla purposes, privately owned weapons, tools, and instruments can be used with effect by many troops. In combat, the seizure of enemy weapons stocks is often a primary objective. Doctrine requires continued efforts to form combat groups, even if adequate conventional weapons are not yet available.

b. Maximum security is given the sites of arms caches. Considerable ingenuity is shown in selecting places which will not be detected by loyalists*.

* The term "loyalist" is used throughout in reference to the forces against whom the guerrillas are fighting. These may be, of course, colonial troops, or those of an occupying or intervening power in some cases.

searches or by casual discovery. These may include caves, hollow trees, underground deposits, or under water in protective wrappings. Caches are situated as close as security permits to planned distribution points.

c. Maintenance requirements depend, to some extent, on where and how long arms are hidden. If possible, they are serviced and prepared thoroughly before concealment to minimize subsequent maintenance requirements. Before issue, all arms are checked and given needed repairs. Arms usually are not issued until the last possible moment before the uprising, although every feasible attempt is made to give weapons training in advance, at least to selected individuals.

21. Bases

a. The securing of bases from which to operate is considered imperative. Base points and communications centers are selected in areas adjacent to, or accessible from, Communist countries, whenever practicable. Facilities for maintaining continued effective military and logistic support from outside the country are established as convenient. Potential avenues of retreat are also marked out and secured. These are used in event of partial or complete failure of the forthcoming guerrilla operations.

b. The base of operations must be centered in terrain favorable for guerrilla operations, such as in forests, mountains, deserts, or jungles. Essential facilities, such as hospitals, radio stations, and

training installations, may not exist in these less developed areas and will have to be established or planned for in advance.

22. Relations With Civilian Population

a. The insurrectionary leaders work closely with the local populace. They test and determine the attitudes of individuals and groups toward the movement. They attempt to insure in advance that various types of support will be rendered to the guerrilla force by local citizens. Secure areas, houses, buildings, or farms are sought out which can be used by the guerrillas for refuge. Persons who can be expected to oppose the movement are singled out and, if they pose a sufficient threat, are earmarked for later extermination.

b. Determination is made in advance of public utility stations, key transportation points, and communications centers, which should be destroyed or, if possible, seized and held. Preliminary efforts are also made to penetrate their operating staffs with loyal Party workers, to facilitate their subsequent disposition.

23. Combat and Political Training

a. The military training of guerrilla cadres, prior to the insurrection, is considered a basic requirement. Such training is of special importance in areas such as some colonial territories, where the bulk of the local population may have had no prior military service.

b. In such training, weapons familiarization is stressed. Future combatants are instructed in the

use of as wide a range of weapons and equipment as possible. This equipment will include types not on hand but which may later be acquired from outside the country or from loyalist troops or arsenals. Persons so trained are expected to instruct others, as necessary, before or during the actual conduct of operations.

c. Marksmanship training is considered of special importance. Dry firing is emphasized to conserve ammunition. Other special subjects include close order drill, combat drill, scouting and patrolling, the use of mines and various types of obstacles, and grenade (or "Molotov cocktail") throwing.

d. All military training is accompanied by heavy doses of political indoctrination. Such indoctrination stresses the objectives of the planned insurrection. It includes violent condemnation of the regime against which it is to be launched. Instruction in Marxism-Leninism and in the objectives of international Communism is also included, of course, if at all practicable. Not all guerrillas fighting in what is essentially the Communist interest, however, as for example in South Vietnam, are well informed about Communist theory and objectives.

24. Plans and Objectives

a. Extensive tactical plans are prepared in advance of any insurrection. Communist military committees prepare, or assist local leaders in preparing, detailed plans for combat operations. These are based on long-range strategic plans and

objectives, careful reconnaissance, and analysis of the relative strengths of rebel and loyalist forces. As far ahead of time as practicable, each combat element is to be given its initial mission, which is to be accomplished as rapidly as possible. Subsequent missions, in accordance with the overall plan, are assigned in light of the developing situation and the commander's own assessment of his capabilities.

b. Operational plans provide sufficient time to permit a careful and detailed reconnaissance of all objectives. Security precautions are stressed to avoid alerting the loyalist forces to the intended actions.

c. Initial objectives of Communist-led or Communist-supported guerrilla operations include the following:

- (1) Achievement of many simultaneous actions in all parts of the country;
- (2) Terrorization of opposition elements within the local populace;
- (3) Isolation of loyalist authorities by seizure or destruction of communications and transport;
- (4) Isolation of loyalist military detachments;
- (5) Seizure of arms stocks and their distribution among the guerrilla groups;
- (6) Seizure of public funds and closure of banks; and
- (7) Institution of identity checks of all persons in base or operational areas.

CHAPTER 4

CONDUCT OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Section I. GROUNDWORK

25. General

The Communists consider guerrilla warfare as a special military art and have developed a detailed body of tactical doctrine for its conduct. This doctrine treats each separate phase of operations thoroughly and is sufficiently broad in scope to account for actions under a variety of conditions and circumstances.

26. Initial Activities

a. In the initial stages of an insurrection, guerrilla bands are organized on a territorial basis. Their first objectives aim at facilitating subsequent operations. They seek to penetrate deeply into loyalist areas to gain the support of the people and to carry out terrorist activities against loyalist leaders and factions. By extending the scope of their operations and by attacking or threatening loyalist base facilities and communications lines, they attempt to avert concentrated loyalist attacks on their own base areas. Guerrillas meanwhile carry out stringent security measures to prevent penetration of their own forces by government agents.

b. Initial combat operations, such as the seizure of arms stores and the destruction of utilities and



Figure 5. Favorable terrain—Communist partisans on a raid in the northern Ukraine, World War II.

communications lines, must be carried out with determination and dispatch. The entire course of the guerrilla effort may depend on their success. Attacking units may, of course, be defeated. Their members then disperse and join other guerrilla bands or melt into the local populace, awaiting a new opportunity.

c. Success in the initial operations is expected to have various favorable effects. The area under guerrilla control will be expanded, increasing the expectation among the local populace that the uprising will succeed. Guerrilla success also will reduce the capabilities, confidence, and esprit of the loyalist forces.

d. As recruits join the movement, additional guerrilla bands are formed. Combat actions assume an ever-greater scope and intensity. Attacks become more frequent and their objectives more varied. Units are expected to develop greater mobility and undertake actions of greater duration and for larger stakes. As the forces and their operations expand, security restrictions necessarily relax somewhat, particularly with regard to checking the reliability of all recruits. Great care is taken, at such a time, to insure that all combat leaders are fully reliable, as well as militarily qualified.

27. Developing Organization

a. As more small guerrilla bands are formed, higher headquarters are established to coordinate and direct their operations. Two or more squads are organized under a platoon headquarters. Two



Figure 6. Favorable terrain—Communist guerrillas in Siberia, 1918.

or more platoons within a company, two or more companies in a battalion, and two or more battalions within a brigade—normally the highest tactical echelon for guerrilla forces. Seldom are more than five subunits assigned to a single commander.

b. Each separate unit is considered capable of some type of independent action. Command control is decentralized to the greatest practicable extent. Within the limits of directives from above, tactical commanders may select daily targets on their own initiative.

c. Continued success and expansion of the size and scope of operations of guerrilla forces lead to their developing the characteristics of a regular army. Larger units, with the normal service and support elements and command structure, are formed. Coordinating and planning staffs are set up. Comprehensive military communications are established. The Communists, of course, make every effort to gain or retain control of such a force. Orthodox Soviet or Chinese military doctrine is employed when such control is achieved.

d. The creation of a conventional force does not necessarily mean the end of guerrilla operations. Bands still located in loyalist-held territory may continue to operate and may even intensify their efforts. They may be supported by the regular forces and seek to coordinate their operations with them. Also, should the army be decisively beaten, it breaks up into small mobile groups. These revert to guerrilla warfare until a time favorable to reestablishment of the regular force.

e. While developing their own combat organization, the insurrectionary or Communist leaders vigorously pursue nonmilitary efforts to weaken and ultimately destroy the loyalist forces. This procedure is believed essential to help offset the assumed initially great advantage of loyalist forces in strength, equipment, organization, and training—as well as to speed their defeat. The Communists assume further that the conflicts and dissensions inherent in the revolutionary situation work to lower the morale and efficiency of loyalist units. Party agents seek to intensify these conflicts. They work within the military units themselves before the beginning of the insurrection. As a result, some units may fight without determination. Others may refuse to fight. Some may even join the rebel forces.

28. Communications

a. Guerrilla communications pose special problems. Units are widely dispersed and technical equipment is in short supply. Special reliance is placed on couriers. Other means include carrier pigeons and dogs, as well as smoke, sound, and light signals. Simple codes may be used for critical messages. In combat, arm and hand signals are relied on as they are not likely to reveal the guerrilla position.

b. Civilian communications lines are employed within base areas. Such use, however, requires special security measures. If telephone lines are laid, they are camouflaged and run across country, not along roads.

c. Guerrillas attempt to establish communications within loyalist-held territory. Mobile radio sets provide the most effective means. Civilian border crossers and refugees can be used to transmit messages. Individuals may be air-dropped into loyalist-held areas or behind enemy lines at night. Carrier pigeons can also be used with effect.

Section II. TACTICS

29. Offensive Tactics

a. *Characteristics of Combat.*

- (1) The Communists affirm that guerrilla tactics are based on the principles of initiative, mobility, and offensive. Operations are to be carefully planned and rehearsed. Tactics are to be modified in accordance with requirements of terrain, weather, and communications. Account must also be made of the general relationships of loyalists, guerrillas, and civilians at the given time and place.
- (2) The Communists consider the distinctive characteristics of guerrilla actions as—
 - (a) Secrecy and swiftness of operations against vulnerable targets.
 - (b) Foreknowledge of loyalist dispositions, movements, and intentions based on reconnaissance and close ties with the local populace.
 - (c) Wide use of ambushes, feints, camouflage, and night attacks.

- (d) Conservation of arms and ammunition.
 - (e) Refusal to keep prisoners—captives are either killed or released, unless held for interrogation.
 - (f) Rapid withdrawals along previously assigned routes (different from approach routes) to collecting points.
- (3) Guerrilla leaders are urged to follow Mao Tse-tung's famous directives:
- (a) "Seem to come from the east, but attack from the west."
 - (b) "Avoid the strong, attack the hollow."
 - (c) "Attack, withdraw, deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision."
 - (d) "Withdraw when the enemy advances, harass him when he rests, strike him when he is weary, pursue him when he withdraws."

b. Targets. Communist-led guerrillas may attack major loyalist forces. More often, however, they direct their efforts against such targets as isolated detachments, communications lines, war industries, and supply dumps. They seek to make it difficult and later impossible for the loyalists to maintain effective military forces, to operate necessary government establishments, and to wage war. Such targets are favorable for guerrilla actions. Usually, they are poorly defended or, at times, undefended. For adequate defense of the relatively large number of such targets, the loyalists must divert abnormally large forces from normal combat operations. This situation creates



Figure 7. Communist-led Vietnamese guerrillas.

a serious maldeployment and signifies the great advantage guerrillas enjoy. The loyalists' ability to mass for attacks on rebel forces is diminished; their problems of supply and coordination of dispersed elements are increased. Yet the dispersion itself provides additional remunerative targets for the guerrilla forces which, because of their mobility and secret movement, are able to attain local superiority at points of their choosing. Such

dispersal also facilitates guerrilla propaganda and psychological warfare operations to subvert isolated loyalist elements.

c. Unity of Command. Centralized control of guerrilla bands is considered essential, whether they unite for combined operations against loyalist targets or conduct separate, simultaneous attacks against them. The overall commander organizes the operation and concentrates his forces in the direction of the main attack. He allocates forces and support for feint attacks and for securing secondary objectives. He imposes careful timing of all phases of the combat actions to increase chances of surprise.

d. Rejection of the Defense. The Communists recognize that guerrilla bands are incapable of conducting successful defensive warfare against a regular army, especially in open terrain. Therefore, guerrilla bands are instructed to refuse a pitched battle whenever possible. Their strength lies in bold and swift surprise attacks, after which they must withdraw quickly and maneuver to attack later in another area. Only under conditions most favorable to themselves will guerrilla forces seek decisive battles.

e. Secrecy of Movement. Guerrilla combat units strive for secret movement over any type of terrain. Only minimum equipment is to be carried on combat missions. Surpluses are cached and may be left under guard until the band returns. When a band marches, it screens the nearby roads. Open terrain is crossed by dashing from one patch of cover to another. If loyalist planes appear,

guerrillas use available concealment. They then may either stand fast or continue the march in dispersed formation.

30. Ambush

Ambush, the favorite guerrilla tactic against other combat forces, is stressed in Communist doctrine. Fixed ambushes are set up in areas providing excellent concealment, good fields of fire from close range, restricted cover and space for deployment or maneuver of loyalist troops, protection from loyalist fires, and hidden routes of withdrawal. The mission of ambushing units may be to annihilate, damage, or only harass the loyalists. The mission and strength of the forces to be ambushed determine the guerrilla strength and armament. Normally, small detachments equipped with rapid-fire small arms are preferred.

a. Attacking Columns. Communist doctrine follows the familiar guerrilla procedure of allowing lead elements, scouts, or reconnaissance vehicles to pass through the ambush untouched. A barricade may be built beyond the ambush site to prevent their escape, but should not be so close as to allow the lead elements to reach it in time to warn the main body. Guerrillas allow the main body to approach within close range and then open fire point-blank along its entire column from both flanks. A small group is stationed in the rear to contain any reinforcements. Other guerrillas move in to mop up remnants and to seize or destroy weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies. If the loyalist column is very long, a second ambush may




Figure 8. Typical Communist-led guerrilla ambush.




Figure 8—Continued.

be set up to strike its tail after it has been halted. Routes of escape or retreat are barricaded and covered with fire by additional guerrilla units. To avoid capture after an ambush, guerrillas melt into the local population or move swiftly to a planned assembly area and return to their base by a predetermined circuitous route.

b. Protection of Guerrilla Bases. When loyalist forces attack guerrilla-held areas or bases, their advance guards are subject to frequent violent ambushes. These are intended to lower the morale and esprit of all troops assigned to such a mission. These tactics, if used over a long period, are considered extremely effective. They may even cause the loyalists to lose their offensive capability. Other ambushes and raids are organized against the rest of the loyalist column, especially at night. Snipers harass the column by day. Thus, the guerrillas use swift-moving offensive tactics to magnify the impression of their strength and to discourage the loyalists from penetrating farther into the rebel area.

c. Attacking Mechanized Convoys. Communist guerrilla doctrine provides that loyalist convoys be ambushed in terrain which restricts vehicular deployment. Roads and roadsides are mined, especially when the loyalists have armor. Tanks may be allowed to approach as near as possible and then are attacked with strings of grenades, "Molotov cocktails," and, if available, antitank and recoilless weapons. When the target is motorized infantry, covering armor may be allowed to pass and is then blocked from returning to support the

infantry. Mines, automatic weapons, hand grenades, and shotguns are considered effective weapons against trucks and truckborne infantry.

d. Roving Ambushes. Roving ambush parties are used near loyalist military camps in an attempt to impress the local populace and to lower the loyalists' morale. Guerrillas may be disguised as civilians and will change their methods of operations frequently. They seek to ambush loyalist supporters and soldiers found alone or in small groups at odd hours. They set up booby traps, using such items as high-explosive charges, land mines, pits, and acid. They also sell poisoned or contaminated liquor and food to soldiers. They may even conduct harassing attacks against billets, passing vehicles, and guards. The Communists consider that rebel propaganda should magnify the success of such operations. This is expected to enhance the image of guerrilla strength in the minds of the populace and to foster a feeling of insecurity among the loyalists.

31. Sabotage

a. Active Sabotage.

- (1) Communist doctrine prescribes that active sabotage operations be carried out under the direction of the highest guerrilla command. Underground Party agents or urban guerrillas (usually bands of four to five men) perform sabotage missions in cities and factories. Guerrillas and peasants operate in rural

areas. Sabotage is considered most effective if it ties down sizable numbers of loyalist troops in static defense.

- (2) Communist writers state that the primary mission of guerrilla sabotage is to disrupt loyalist communications. Bridges, roads, railroads, and telephone lines are prime targets. Guerrillas may perform such basic acts of sabotage on their own initiative and may force members of the local populace to undertake them as well. War industries, military supply dumps, sewers, powerlines, dams, and water supplies may also be attacked. The purpose is to increase general dissatisfaction and confusion to the greatest extent possible. Landlords, merchants, and industrialists may be subjected to threats or acts of sabotage to restrict their collaboration with the loyalists. Rebels take care not to antagonize the public needlessly, while their sabotage slowly paralyzes operations of the loyalist forces. Of course, vital targets may be sabotaged regardless of the anticipated public reaction.

b. Passive Sabotage. The Party directs passive sabotage operations in key loyalist industries and communications centers through its front organizations. It seeks thus to increase economic disorders and to block movements of troops and supplies. Such operations include—

- (1) Strikes and slowdowns among laborers.

- (2) Deliberate errors in loading and dispatching supplies.
- (3) Pretended accidents and illnesses.
- (4) Surreptitious acts to damage equipment.

32. Terror

a. One of the most potent guerrilla weapons is terror. Communist doctrine teaches that terror must be absolute to be fully effective. Terror is used to demoralize loyalists and to extort support from neutrals. It is intended also to exact complete obedience and discipline from individual guerrillas. It is made clear, for example, that defection or betrayal is punishable by death, even if the individual had been forcibly drafted into the movement. Should a defector reach an area free of insurrectionary control, he knows his family will be held accountable.


b. Terror operations in loyalist territory are carried out against individuals or entire groups of people. The former may include the person, family, and property of government, military, and police officials; influential private citizens; industrial, commercial, and laborunion leaders; and anti-Communist heads of nonloyalist organizations. Terror is carried out by beatings, kidnapping, mutilation, assassination, arson, and bombing. Threats of terror are used to force individuals to obey rebel instructions. Terrorists may use loyalist police or military uniforms and vehicles during such operations to deceive the public and inflame them against the government.

c. Terror is brutal and often inhuman. In many circumstances, however, it is expected to establish the community support needed by the guerrillas. Terror is considered especially successful wherever the loyalists can be provoked into cruel counterterror measures against the general populace.

d. In guerrilla-held areas, mass terror may be unleashed against segments of the population who, by virtue of their class origins, wealth, or employment, are judged to be pro-loyalist. Party leaders try to make the populace share responsibility for such actions. In so doing, they cement their ties to the uprising. For example, in Communist China, "people's courts" rendered directed verdicts upon landlords. Simple villagers often were required to stone the accused to death.

33. Attack on Military Headquarters

Military headquarters are regarded as primary targets. Communist doctrine requires a thorough preliminary reconnaissance before an attack on a headquarters. It is necessary to determine in advance the areas used for the staff, weapons sites, officers' quarters, fuel dumps, motor parks, and guardhouse. Countersigns and the exact locations of sentries, listening posts, and patrol routes are also learned beforehand. A raid on a headquarters is brief and extremely violent. Material which the guerrillas cannot themselves use is destroyed. Staff personnel are eliminated if possible. Guerrillas carry off documents, encoding devices, and any other items of value they can find.



*Figure 9. Chinese Communist "people's court."
(Reproduced with permission of LIFE magazine.)*

34. Attack on Airfields

a. Since guerrillas seldom have their own air force, Communist leaders envisage that they will attack loyalist aircraft on the ground.

b. Preliminary intelligence is collected on the exact locations of planes, ground vehicles, supply dumps, and guards. Demolition groups are given maximum cover. Individuals or small groups, protected by covering forces, kill sentinels in their immediate area. Mines, grenades, incendiary bombs, and armor-piercing incendiary rifle bullets are used to destroy planes, hangars, ammunition depots, and fuel dumps.

35. Attack on Supply Installations

Supply dumps are a primary target. Guerrillas acquire much of their own supply needs from loyalist stocks. Beyond this, they are instructed to destroy warehouses and supply dumps by burning, after first rendering useless any fire-fighting equipment on hand. They use incendiary grenades or armor-piercing incendiary bullets to blow up ammunition and explosives stocks .

36. Attack on Communications

a. *Wire and Radio Facilities.* The Communists stress the need for guerrilla attacks on loyalist communications in all areas. The elimination of radio stations, telephone switchboards, and wire lines is considered especially important, even deep behind loyalist lines. Destruction is thorough and systematic. Telegraph and telephone poles are chopped down and burned, whole sections of wire

are cut up and removed, and power facilities are blown up.

b. Railroads. The primary objective of attacks against trains is destruction of locomotives. Ambushes may be organized in a number of areas, for example, in deep cuts or on high embankments, slopes, or curves. Rail movements can also be halted by destroying or damaging various objects along the route. These may include bridges, tunnels, sections of track, block signals, switches, frogs, water towers, turntables, and stations. To delay transportation as much as possible, the Communists teach that derailments should be caused in places where wreckage and repair operations are most difficult. Some examples are bridges, tunnels, and stretches of single track.

- (1) When guerrillas ambush troop trains, the main body is positioned where the middle car of the train will stop after the locomotive is blown up. Additional groups with machineguns and submachineguns are located at the rear of the train on both sides of the track. These groups can then fire on troops getting off the train along its entire length.
- (2) In attacks on railroad stations, primary objectives are the destruction of the facility and the procurement of supplies. The attacking force is divided into three main groups. The combat unit disposes of guards silently and destroys the communications center. The demolition unit blows up assigned objectives. Reserves

cover the attack and remain prepared to reinforce either of the other groups. Each guerrilla is well rehearsed and should know his individual role perfectly. If possible, the guerrillas destroy several kilometers of tracks and communications lines near the station before withdrawing. Commanders make thorough preparations and assign the following:

- (a) Parts of the station to be attacked.
- (b) Objectives, personnel, and equipment for each attacking group.
- (c) Amount and placement of explosives and the time to complete preparatory work.
- (d) Signal for detonation of the explosives.
- (e) Locations where guerrillas must take cover during the explosions.
- (f) Time and place of assembly after the attack.

37. Attack on Populated Areas

a. If detailed preparations are made, guerrilla bands are considered capable of conducting raids on villages, towns, and even small cities. Such operations are deemed dangerous and difficult. Normally they are conducted entirely in the hours of darkness. Even if they fail, they are considered to have tremendous psychological value. Preliminary reconnaissance is considered essential and must be exceedingly thorough. Special features of the operations plan include—

- (1) Assignment of experts to eliminate guards silently in areas selected for infiltration.
- (2) Signals for the start and end of operations.
- (3) Assembly points and collection points in the event of both success and failure.
- (4) Special communications procedures.
- (5) Command information, including the location of the commander during the battle and the designation of deputies.

b. Guerrilla objectives include the seizure of supplies, destruction of loyalist military stocks, freeing of rebel prisoners, and killing of loyalist leaders. Actions are swift and violent, but unnecessary destruction is avoided in order not to alienate the townspeople.

c. After a successful attack, some or all of the following actions are taken before withdrawal, if time permits:

- (1) The populace is assembled and rebel proclamations are read.
- (2) Searches are conducted for arms, military equipment, and loyalist leaders and supporters.
- (3) Reprisals are carried out for past actions aiding the government or for failure to aid rebels.
- (4) Land and goods belonging to the government, wealthy private individuals, or business concerns are distributed to the public.

- (5) Hostages are seized to insure future co-operation.
- (6) The public is promised that the rebels will return.

d. Some Party members may remain behind to continue organizational work in the area when the guerrillas depart.

38. Attack on Boats

a. Communist doctrine envisages guerrilla attacks on isolated boats or barges at night. Attack teams consist of no fewer than 10 guerrillas. They are equipped with light, speedy boats. The members require special training in swimming and boating.

b. Waterborne guerrillas try to achieve surprise. They may employ such disguises as fishermen or ferrymen. They approach as close as possible to the loyalist boat, using any pretext, suddenly board it, and quickly secure control. The loyalist boat may be sunk or kept for further guerrilla use. Two guerrillas usually remain in their own boat throughout the attack in the event a quick getaway becomes necessary.

39. Attack on Police Stations

a. The Communists assess the objectives of attacks on police stations to be: Seizure of arms and ammunition; killing policemen; and releasing political prisoners. Preliminary reconnaissance collects intelligence concerning the strength, internal layout, operations, and routes of approach. Such information may be obtained by questioning

released prisoners. It is verified by other means, as by a guerrilla who impersonates a victim reporting some crime. Plans for the raid provide for: Procurement of special equipment to break open locks and iron bars; a concealed approach route or assembly point near the station; isolation of the area, including the cutting of all communications; signals for each phase of the attack and withdrawal, and the rendezvous point. If the police strength in the station is excessive, a diversion is created to draw off a portion of the force before the raid. In such a case, the guerrilla leader insures that the diversion has been successful before starting the raid.

b. The Communists prefer that the time for the attack be fixed between midnight and dawn. One party is designated to effect initial surprise in securing entry and to eliminate any sentry. A second party disposes of sleeping policemen and then acts as a covering force. Other parties are assigned as required to collect arms or to release prisoners. The operation is well rehearsed and conducted on signal with the greatest speed and efficiency.

40. Defensive Tactics

a. Although the Communists emphasize that guerrilla tactics are primarily offensive, defensive plans and training are not neglected. Encirclement or surprise may lead to annihilation, so bands are required always to keep an alert defensive posture. They are instructed to maintain favorable relations with the local population to

gain all possible intelligence of loyalist movements. Guerrilla forces employ scouts and sentinels at all practicable times. They send out detachments as flank guards when displacing, and post guards in pairs when in camp.

b. Unless they are within a safe guerrilla base, bands move frequently, particularly after combat operations. If a band is sufficiently strong, it will send an advance party with all supplies forward to prepare the rendezvous area that is to be used following an attack and to set up its defenses. If the band is too small to permit splitting its force, it establishes supply caches at various points. These are recovered following the operation, during the retreat to a new encampment.

c. Communist-led guerrillas are required to stress mobile defense. They may be forced, however, to assume positional defense at least for a limited time, despite the great advantage conventional forces normally have for combat under these conditions. Such a defense requires relatively large numbers of troops. Guerrillas are detached to block all approaches to the area, prepare and man field fortifications, and provide security for the fixed defenses.

d. Even on defense, guerrillas make every feasible effort to retain the element of surprise. To maintain secrecy, local inhabitants are not permitted to enter the defensive sector. If already within it, they are not permitted to cross into loyalist areas.

e. In retreat, guerrilla defensive strategy is based partly on a scorched-earth policy. Every

practicable effort is made to make the loyalists pay as high a price as possible for each advance. Individual guerrillas are expected to hold key positions to the death, unless they receive orders to withdraw.

f. When guerrilla forces are encircled, Communist doctrine suggests that they fight a position defense until nightfall. After dark, the guerrillas disperse and move through loyalist lines on the best available escape paths, observing the greatest silence. They use feints and demonstrations for deception. They may also seek to break out by concentrating their forces for a sudden surprise attack at a single point in the encircling enemy ring.

Section III. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

41. Supply

a. In the initial period of insurrection, supply of guerrilla bands is a special problem. Communist-led rebels, unless situated on the border of a Communist country, usually will not have a safe supply base. They avoid accumulation of large stockpiles at single supply points because of the danger that loyalist forces will overrun them. Supply lines from points outside the rebel base are also vulnerable.

b. As the rebellion spreads and large guerrilla bases are established, supply problems actually grow more complex. Mass popular organizations are developed to procure food and additional types and larger quantities of equipment. Secure supply

lines are sought through loyalist territory and basic industries are established in rebel territory.

(1) *Supply lines.*

- (a) The regions which favor guerrilla operations present difficult supply problems. Farms, industry, and equipment sources are lacking. The Communists stress the importance of establishing secure supply lines and keeping at least a minimum amount of essential goods on hand in event of emergencies. Motor vehicles or, more typically, animals, particularly mules, may be used to transport the supplies. If these are not available, human portage is used. In some cases supplies are obtained by air or sea, mainly from other Communist countries.
- (b) Goods may be acquired locally by purchase, donation, seizure, or guerrilla production. Supply lines are established within both rebel-occupied areas and loyalist-held territory. In rebel bases, supplies move along the easiest routes, using any available transportation means. In loyalist territory, the movement of supplies is organized clandestinely. Knowledge of the operations and participants is strictly compartmentalized. Carrying parties move at night to assigned locations. They pick up supplies, transport them to the next assigned point,

and conceal them. For security reasons no group knows more of the overall operation than its own role. Should carrying parties be unable to reach through loyalist lines into the guerrilla base, the supplies may be cached and be picked up by a guerrilla unit in a subsequent raid for that purpose.

- (2) *Local production.* Guerrillas are encouraged to operate or utilize small industrial workshops within their bases, and, to a lesser degree, in loyalist territory. They manufacture and repair such items as shoes, leather goods, canvas goods, small arms, ammunition, mines, simple metal wares, and communications equipment. They also preserve foods and assist in the harvest of crops during inactive periods. By such operations, guerrillas secure necessary produce and also help to cement ties with the local populace.

42. Medical Support

a. At the outset of hostilities, medical support for guerrillas is limited to personal first aid and the care which can be provided by the few available aid men. Doctrine prescribes that the wounded and sick be carried along with the band until they recover, die, or can be left with trusted civilian medical personnel. Medical supplies normally are very limited and treatment is crude. In

this period, doctors or aid men may be required to serve with active units and to perform guerrilla duties, including combat.

b. In later phases of the insurrection, sick and wounded are taken to semipermanent camps and safe houses and left there to recover. Medical specialists periodically visit such installations and supervise the care of the patients. As more medical supplies are made available, patients receive improved treatment.

c. When guerrilla bases are established, regular hospitals are set up to handle serious casualties. Medical support is then organized in three echelons: The stretcher bearers (if available) and aid men with the combat forces; receiving dispensaries; and hospitals. Medicines may be obtained from health organizations and local doctors in loyalist areas or, perhaps, from the Red Cross. Whenever possible, the rebels introduce medical care for the general public as well as for their own forces.

43. Civil Affairs

Continuing Communist political operations are considered an important adjunct to military operations both in areas under loyalist control and in the guerrilla base. Naturally, different tactics must be employed in the two areas. The principal objective of all actions is to gain popular support for the insurrection. Political operations also aim to increase the number and power of the rebel forces and to reduce the number and strength of the loyalists.

a. *Guerrilla-Controlled Areas.* Within guerrilla bases and in surrounding areas, Communist-led rebels form militia units. These maintain public order and act as a reserve force. All adults may be required to perform such service, but usually volunteers are solicited. Militia assignments are performed on an off-duty basis without pay. Militiamen are not allowed to neglect their daily civilian work. Party members recruit, organize, indoctrinate, and closely supervise militia operations. Ex-guerrillas conduct military training and serve as unit commanders. Militia assignments include: Acting as a propaganda outlet for rebel laws, decrees, and orders; guarding border areas and coastlines; guarding rebel production and supplies; conducting operations against lawless elements, anti-Communists, and loyalist agents; enforcing confiscation and redistribution of land and personal property; collecting intelligence; and assisting the guerrillas by carrying supplies, evacuating casualties, and performing special services to maintain morale.

- (1) *Objectives.* In guerrilla territories, the Party organizes front groups to conduct most of its direct dealings with the public. Non-Communist political parties and groups are invited to participate in these organizations which seek to extend their influence into loyalist areas. Programs and operations are carefully supervised to insure popular acceptance and support while dividing or neutralizing the opposition. A temporary government may

ultimately be set up which will seek to lower taxes for the general public, enact laws which will seem more liberal and beneficial to peasants, improve medical treatment, and facilitate the storage and handling of supplies.

(2) *Activities.*

- (a) All political and economic steps that are taken are intended to favor the general public's attitude and to discredit former pro-loyalist elements. Special care is taken to prevent impoverishment of the area by the direct action of the rebels. Regulations which promote general conflict or hardship are avoided. Every effort is made to increase productivity. Uncommitted military forces are required to engage in useful civilian pursuits. Unsavory and nonproductive civilian occupations such as banditry, gambling, and the narcotics trade are suppressed. Peasants may be allowed or encouraged to travel into loyalist areas so that they can propagandize rebel reforms and increase dissatisfaction with the old regime. Repressive acts against loyalist supporters are justified under the cloak of legality or wartime expediency.
- (b) Communist-trained counterintelligence specialists operate in rebel territory to keep down counterrevolutionary

violence. They conduct mass terror against persons, who, because of their class origin or previous profession, are suspected of favoring the loyalists. In addition, they deal out swift, harsh, punishment to pro-loyalist guerrillas and to their families.

b. Loyalist-Controlled Areas.

- (1) The Party conducts various types of clandestine political and economic operations within loyalist areas. Agitators, working under cover, seek to create an atmosphere of noncooperation and hostility toward the loyalist leaders and objectives. Propaganda stresses rebel military victories and political reforms, and the favorable aspects of rebel rule. Funds are collected through taxes, direct donations, and the sale of bonds. Care is taken to protect the secret collection organization. Agents work to entice or coerce as many individuals as possible to aid the guerrillas. Individuals who collaborate with the rebels, under duress, by furnishing supplies, funds, or other assistance may then be blackmailed into performing still more compromising acts under threat of exposure. They thus may become fully committed to the rebel cause.
- (2) Meanwhile sabotage and terror are used under Communist direction to paralyze loyalist ranks and promote a growing demand for peace at any price. Communist

doctrine stresses that murder and other acts of terror should not be used indiscriminately. Such acts may be carried out only against recognized loyalists, and under circumstances involving minimum risks to the guerrilla supporters and the cause.

CHAPTER 5

INTELLIGENCE, SUBVERSION, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Section I. ROLE

44. General

Communist doctrine prescribes specially prominent roles for intelligence, subversion, and psychological warfare activities as important elements of guerrilla warfare. Such activities provide direct or indirect support to military operations. They also broaden the scope of insurrectionary capabilities to achieve success.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE

45. General

The conduct of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence is considered, especially by the Communists, as a basic requirement of guerrilla warfare in all its phases.

46. Positive Intelligence

a. Sources. Primary Communist intelligence operatives include Party members, sympathizers, and agents. In an insurrectionary situation, the movement will be served by all anti-loyalist elements in the population, prisoners, kidnapped officials, combat reconnaissance, and an expanding network of secret agents.

b. Essential Elements of Information. For guerrilla military purposes, information on the loyalist military and quasi-military forces, police, and gendarmerie takes the highest priority. Essential elements include—

- (1) Location, strength, armament, and morale of all forces and units.
- (2) Location of supply points, especially for weapons and ammunition.
- (3) Layout of loyalist positions and installations, which may serve as fruitful targets for guerrilla attacks.
- (4) Location and method of operation of loyalist communications equipment.
- (5) Loyalist plans, operational orders, and tactical doctrine.
- (6) Quality and status of the organization, training, and leadership of loyalist forces.

47. Counterintelligence

The detection and reporting of counterintelligence information is considered a primary duty of all rebels and rebel supporters. Counterintelligence is viewed as essential to prevent the planting of intelligence operatives and *agents provocateurs* within the guerrilla force and the native population of guerrilla-held territories. It has a special usefulness for Communist leaders who seek to ferret out rebels who oppose purely Communist objectives and who might gain too great an influence within the movement itself.

Section III. SUBVERSION

48. General

a. Subversion of loyalist military forces is a major objective. It is considered particularly important to help overcome their usual overwhelming initial physical superiority to the newly organized, small, scattered, and poorly equipped and poorly trained guerrilla forces. Efforts at subversion are begun well before the actual outbreak of a revolt. Where active Communist Party organizations exist, including members and cells within the loyalist force itself, they can be used as prime agencies of subversion.

b. Efforts within the loyalist military forces consist of agitation and propaganda to subvert or undermine the confidence of the troops. Secondary missions include intelligence collection, weapons acquisition for the guerrilla forces, and the destruction or concealment of loyalist equipment and supplies. Highly successful subversive efforts will result in the defection of an entire unit, with its commander and equipment, to the guerrilla cause. Otherwise, subversion is expected to cause inattention to orders, indiscipline, mutiny, or defection by individual loyalist soldiers.

Section IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

49. General

Psychological warfare, having the same general objectives as subversion, is carried out on as broad a scale as possible. It is intended to counter loyalist propaganda, to weaken the will of

loyalist supporters, and to gain support for the rebel cause. It is carried out by such means as public lectures, demonstrations, newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, pamphlets, and posters.

50. Themes

a. Major themes are general affairs within the country and the successes and expected favorable results of a rebel victory. The loyalist army is portrayed as an illegitimate, oppressive force. The guerrilla forces are described as the instrument of the people for gaining social justice. The Communist leadership is careful to play down Marxist themes which might arouse adverse reactions—such as antireligious views and outright state ownership of the land.

b. Various racial, religious, national, cultural, economic, and social groups are catered to. Their problems are attributed to the loyalist regime. The rebel cause is depicted as holding out immediate and complete satisfaction of their hopes and aspirations.

c. Rumors are spread of the imminent collapse and flight of the loyalist government. Graft and corruption among government leaders are “exposed.” Police “brutalities” are publicized. Currency inflation and food shortages are prophesied. False information is reported concerning loyalist defeats in combat.

d. Particular efforts to destroy the fighting effectiveness of the loyalist military forces may include agitation for —

(1) A shorter term of service.

- (2) The right of persons of humble origins or persecuted minority groups to high military rank.
- (3) Improved conditions of service life.
- (4) Higher pay, especially for enlisted ranks.
- (5) A "democratization" of military authority, discipline, and justice.
- (6) A system of soldiers' representatives, to air grievances and seek redress from higher authority.
- (7) The election of officers.

CHAPTER 6

COMBAT IN CITIES

Section I. GENERAL

51. Features of City Warfare

a. City fighting is not typical of guerrilla warfare. To be most effective, guerrilla operations should be conducted over broad expanses of difficult terrain where conventional forces will be at the greatest disadvantage. Guerrillas seek to avoid concentrating masses of their own forces or attacking large groupings of regular troops. In cities, forces are necessarily concentrated. The administrative, logistic, and communications facilities provide conventional forces with the opportunity to exploit their greater capabilities to the utmost—limited only by their unwillingness to reduce the entire urban area to rubble. For these reasons, city warfare is, as a rule, carefully avoided by guerrillas. Lawrence of Arabia commented that “the idea of assaulting Medina [where the Turkish main force was located] . . . was not in accord with the best strategy. Rather, let the enemy stay in Medina, and in every other harmless place, in the largest numbers.”

b. Nonetheless, as centers of population, industry, communications, and governmental authority, cities are especially important targets. The seizure of key urban areas, if practicable, could provide a rebel force with a quick and relatively easy victory. Perhaps the classic example of this was the succession of uprisings in the heart of Paris in

the first half of the 19th Century. Several of these resulted in changes in the French Government, capped by the establishment of the Second Republic in 1848.

c. The chances for success of a city uprising are greatest when such a movement is directed against indigenous loyalist forces. Regular armies, however much greater their strength and superior their equipment, usually hesitate to undertake full-scale operations against their own people and at the cost of destroying one or more of their own cities. The reticence of the French Army to root out the dissident forces in Algiers is a modern example of this historic tendency. Occupation armies, composed of foreign troops, are usually less merciful. For example, the Polish uprising in Warsaw in the autumn of 1944 was ruthlessly destroyed by the Germans.

d. Taking account of the peculiar advantages—and risks—involved, the Communists have developed a body of city-warfare doctrine to be used by rebel forces. Guerrilla combat in cities usually is to be carried out simultaneously with counter-part operations in the countryside. Commenting on this and other aspects of guerrilla warfare in cities, Che Guevara, a key leader of the Castro revolution in Cuba, has said in effect: Guerrilla forces in suburban areas must not operate independently of other forces in conflict but must gear their operations to the objectives and plans of other forces in other areas. Forces must be small, must be trained in sabotage, and must maintain extremely severe discipline.

52. The Red Guard

a. Communist-led irregular forces in cities are usually called the Red Guard. Members may consist primarily of Party members, intellectuals, workers, students, and youths. They are initially organized in small groups of 3 to 10 fighters, preferably all from the same shop, mill, factory, city block, school, or other institution or area. Large units usually are not created in the prerevolt period.

b. The political reliability of all fighters is a matter of serious concern. Marxist study and propaganda classes are conducted to raise their loyalty to the revolution and to help ferret out loyalist *agents provocateurs*.



Figure 10. Russian "Red Guard" members 1917.

c. The organization of the Red Guard is simple and takes into consideration the armament of the rebels. As soon as the insurrection starts, plans envisage the formation of squads or groups (10 to 20 men), platoons (35 to 40 men), and companies of two or three platoons. In some cases, battalions and regiments are also planned. Formation of divisions and larger units normally is not planned for until the start of large-scale field warfare. At such times, the rebel forces are called a Red Army.

53. Communications

Communist-led rebel commanders at all echelons are taught to regard effective communications as being as important to success in combat as any other single factor.

a. Means.

- (1) Rebel communications capabilities are usually more primitive than those of the loyalists. Available technical means (telephone, telegraph, radiotelegraph, radiotelephone, and various light, sound, and mechanical devices) are extremely limited, at least initially. Communications are maintained primarily by commanders in person, by liaison officers to subordinate units, and by messengers on foot, bicycle, motorcycle, or automobile.
- (2) Existing civilian telephone lines may be used, but initially on only a limited scale. If the rebels seize the city central exchange and regional telephone stations

or if loyalist signal troops can be induced to defect and join the insurrection, wider use is made of civilian lines. Telegraph normally is not used except to communicate with other regions or cities.

- (3) The Communists stress the need of seizing city communications installations in the opening phases of the uprising. Aircraft radio and radar navigation and identification systems, motor parks, telephone exchanges, and radio, telegraph, and radiotelegraph stations are seized. These are not only of great value for rebel communications, but their control precludes loyalist forces from using them. The Communists believe that as the rebellion progresses, communications problems become easier to solve because of the capture of signal facilities, the defection of loyalist military technicians, and the recruitment of civilian specialists.

b. Procedures. The Communist leaders of city uprisings compensate for the shortage of technical signal equipment at the outbreak of hostilities by the appropriate organization of forces and by the careful coordination of all actions and missions. Immediate and subsequent objectives are assigned, and each commander must render assistance, when needed, to adjacent units. Commanders are expected to know the general plan sufficiently well to carry out its concept on their own initiative when out of communication with

higher headquarters. Rebel headquarters, meanwhile, tries to organize communications with the combat groups as best possible. In so doing, they keep abreast of the situation and remain in a position to make necessary additional decisions. The principal features of typical rebel communications operations are as follows:

- (1) Trained liaison officers are detailed to combat units to keep headquarters informed concerning the local situation. Such officers are well versed in headquarters plans. Should the situation require, they issue appropriate orders to the smaller unit in the name of the commander.
- (2) Each combat group and headquarters trains several soldiers to carry messages to other headquarters and units.
- (3) Auxiliary message centers are established to receive reports from combat leaders.
- (4) Headquarters send regular couriers to deliver messages to lower units and to pick up reports from them.
- (5) Units employ more than one means to deliver a given message under dangerous or uncertain conditions.

c. Security. Communications are made as invulnerable and secure as possible. Telephone lines are camouflaged. Specially important lines, as well as regional and central exchanges, are placed under guard to prevent their capture and use by loyalists. Classified information may be discussed

only if a prearranged code is used. If there is a chance that messengers may be captured, important reports and orders are oral, not written. Women and children are less likely to be suspected of carrying messages and it is thus considered advantageous to use them for this purpose.

54. Peculiarities of City Fighting

The Communists consider that the methods to be used for fighting in a city depend on its size, layout, natural topography, and the structural design of its buildings. Rebel leaders are expected to know the city thoroughly and to have the correct tactical appreciation of its various districts, streets, squares, buildings, and building complexes from the point of view of both offensive and defensive use. They also are to study the political, economic, and sociological composition of the population and learn details concerning transportation and communication facilities throughout the area. The uprising normally starts in areas where workers predominate, although nearby simultaneous disturbances may be caused in other regions. The movement may take the form of a general concentric attack against the center of the city.

a. Advantages of Night Combat. The Communists assume that the conditions in a city generally favor the use of night combat for rebel forces, and they are indoctrinated to prefer it. Their first attacks normally commence at night, and throughout the entire course of the fighting they capitalize on the inherent advantages of

darkness. Bold surprise attacks at night have such missions as exhausting the loyalist forces, destroying their communications, and killing their leaders.

b. Role of Initiative. Initiative at lower levels is stressed, since it is often impossible to establish firm communications between commanders and subordinates. Officers and men alike are expected to be capable of independent actions within the scope of the overall plan. Consequently, the assignment of competent military commanders at all levels and the intensive training of troops receive serious attention. Political reliability appears less important than military ability and many combat groups may be led by non-Communists.

55. The Plan

a. Rebel leaders are urged by Communist doctrine to work out a carefully detailed plan for the initial uprising based on painstakingly collected intelligence. They conduct "war games" to test the plan before its implementation. The plan provides for assignment of forces to each separate objective, mutual support between individuals and groups, the time for assembly of rebel forces, and the time of attack. Precise coordination is particularly important in the conduct of all surprise attacks, especially in the first uprising. Rebel forces are required to execute their assigned tasks exactly on schedule in order to achieve the greatest possible surprise and reduce the chances of defeat.

b. Simultaneous uprisings normally are planned for a number of cities, throughout an entire region, or, if at all possible, throughout the whole country. The rebels thus can employ all their strength at once and pin down dispersed loyalist forces. This tactic prevents their concentration to defeat the rebel forces in detail.

Section II. TACTICS

56. Overall Objectives

In city warfare, as elsewhere, preliminary Communist plans do not visualize an immediate victory over the strong, organized, loyalist forces. The rebels' mission in the first phase is to improve the relative strength of their combat forces with respect to the loyalists and to create conditions for future victory. Immediate goals are: Seizing weapons; arming recruits; organizing mutinies in loyalist units; bringing loyalists over to the rebel side with their weapons; seizing critical tactical objectives; and liquidating at least some key loyalist leaders.

57. Initial Efforts

a. The rebels normally have the advantage of surprise and initiative in landing the first attacks. Loyalist forces may be aware that an uprising is being prepared, but they do not know the rebel strength or when, where, and in what strength attacks will occur.

b. If the initial attack is unsuccessful, the loyalists are blockaded in camp, if possible, until

rebel reinforcements arrive. The besieged loyalists are cut off from all external contacts, including water and electricity. They are subjected to constant physical and moral pressure through continuing, daring, surprise attacks and psychological warfare until they surrender or are annihilated.

c. Communist cells in loyalist units attempt to organize mutinies with the objectives of liquidating the command elements and leading the troops over to the rebel side. Significant numbers of rebels are to be integrated with such defecting loyalist units to insure their political reliability. If loyalist troops do succeed in entering the city, barricade tactics are employed against them. They are blocked from the front and simultaneously attacked from the streets to their rear, from windows, and from roofs.

d. Communist doctrine demands that the populace be drawn into the fight in time to support and reinforce the initial surprise attack. Captured arms are issued to reliable sympathizers and additional forces are organized.

e. As a rule, in the beginning of an insurrection all rebel forces are committed. Reserve forces are considered necessary, however, for use in subsequent operations. They are created during the fighting by recruiting, organizing, and equipping new combat groups and individual replacements, primarily from the ranks of the people.

58. Followup Attacks

a. *Exploitation of Surprise.* Guerrillas take every possible advantage of their favorable posi-

tion as the attacking force. In exploiting initial victories gained by surprise, the rebels seek to deny the loyalists time to regroup their forces. No political or other considerations (e.g., lack of weapons or even lack of intelligence information concerning the enemy) can be permitted to weaken the tempo of the rebel attacks.

b. Plan of Followup Attack. The course of followup attacks is based on the intelligence information collected. It is simple, but no significant detail can be overlooked. The plan envisages the systematic destruction of enemy units. Combat missions assigned to individual subordinate units are clear and specific. The plan provides for the immediate consolidation of positions in captured buildings and streets to be used later as new attack positions. It includes necessary assignments and orders to cover subsequent actions in the event of failure.

c. Supporting Fires. Special attention is paid to defensive heavy weapons. If the rebel force has artillery or mortars, their primary mission is the destruction of loyalist heavy weapons. Rebel guns normally are emplaced in the city's outskirts or in plazas. Forward observers, together with necessary communications, accompany the attacking units. If possible, rebels displace guns in close support of attacking units for direct fire. Mortars are considered particularly effective in city warfare. Hand grenades and high explosive charges are also held to be very effective against troops, materiel, and minor obstacles.

d. Infantry Actions. Virtually the entire weight

of the attack in city warfare falls on the foot soldier in small combat units. Only infantrymen can enter buildings to mop up enemy holdouts and snipers or cross rubble-strewn areas to maintain the momentum of an attack. In addition to normal light infantry weapons, they may be equipped with axes, crowbars, picks, and rope ladders. These may be needed for breaking down doors, partitions, walls, fences, and obstacles, or in moving from one floor of a building to another.

(1) *Street fighting.*

(a) Street combat involves fighting by separate small groups. The attack may be conducted in a series of small actions, moving down a street, or in small encirclements, effected by penetrations through buildings, courtyards, and gardens. A second method, considered to be slower but surer and entailing fewer losses, is to outflank loyalist positions and thus disorganize their entire defense.

(b) If the rebels have sufficient artillery and mortars to knock out loyalist heavy weapons, they attack along the streets. Otherwise, they confine their actions to small encircling efforts. Often they use a combination of the two tactics simultaneously.

(2) *Barricades.* Tanks or armored cars are used to support the attack of barricades. If the rebels lack armor, small infantry units storm the barricades under the

supporting fires of artillery and machine-guns. Primary artillery targets are heavy weapons, enemy troops, and buildings which dominate the barricades. Frontal attacks against a barricade are accompanied by simultaneous actions by other rebel forces to encircle it from the flanks.

(3) *Attacks on buildings.*

- (a) Before attacks are made on separate buildings or groups of buildings, these are isolated by occupying surrounding buildings and covering all escape routes. Coordinated supporting fires are conducted primarily by artillery and heavy weapons. Rebel machine-



Figure 11. Communist-prepared city barricade.

guns are emplaced in windows and on roofs of neighboring buildings. They attempt to keep under fire all dominating balconies, windows, and roofs. The assault, when launched, proceeds quickly and energetically.

- (b) Rebels conduct a thorough search of the captured buildings. If the inhabitants have helped the loyalists, they are imprisoned.

e. The Reserve. The reserve is required to be strong and located near the area being attacked. Commanders of companies or battalions frequently will be required to maintain a reserve element. Principal missions for reserves are to exploit a successful attack, to reinforce attacking units, and to take care of unexpected developments.

59. Planning the Defense

a. General. Communist doctrine considers a prolonged defense fatal to a city uprising. Therefore, the defense is considered a temporary phase before resuming the offensive. The defense may be assumed for the following reasons: To gain time to concentrate rebel forces and switch over to the offensive; to hold on secondary fronts to concentrate forces for a main attack on another front; to retain seized areas and points; or to protect troop dispositions which are resting or regrouping. Rebels may utilize defensive actions in various battle areas in the beginning of the uprising or during loyalist attacks against a cap-

tured city before the rebels are prepared to extend the fighting beyond the city. The Communists maintain that success in such cases depends chiefly on the support of the rebels by the majority of the populace in repelling loyalist attacks, regardless of cost. They also stress the importance of the efficiency and popularity of political and military leaders, the skillful organization of the defense, and superior strength.

b. Public Participation. According to the Communists, popular support is especially important when it is necessary to build up rebel military forces in the heat of battle. The Party and military leaders attempt to organize and lead public participation in the revolt. The insurrectionary headquarters employs agitation, propaganda, and demagoguery.



Figure 12. Civilians assisting in construction of a city barricade.

c. *Logistic Support.* Leaders employ carefully planned procedures to equip and supply new combat groups and to support those already engaged. They also seek to convert the city industries to military production. Managerial staffs, including engineers and technicians, are induced to continue to work under the rebel leadership.

- (1) *Food.* Existing food stocks are inventoried and stored in special warehouses. Food is rationed in accordance with military requirements; the distribution of sufficient food to military forces and workers in war industries is the first consideration. Nonsupporters of the revolt are placed on short rations. The private sale and distribution of foodstuffs is either forbidden or closely regulated.
- (2) *Medical supplies.* All medical facilities and personnel are registered and used for rebel purposes. Evacuation of wounded is given special attention because of the important effect on morale in the combat units.
- (3) *Field fortifications.* The general public is required to work on fortifications, when these are necessary. Combat groups are freed from such work except in forward areas to give them as much time as possible to prepare for future combat actions.
- (4) *Transportation.* Rebels commandeer available transportation for moving com-

bat forces and supplies. Expedients may be used to convert civilian vehicles into armored personnel carriers by attaching armor plate and mounting machineguns on them. Subways, where available, are considered particularly useful means for the rapid, concealed movement and concentration of military forces.

d. Arrest of Opposition Leaders. Opposition leaders are seized and placed in isolation upon capture. The rebel leaders notify the public in advance that such leaders will be immediately executed in the event of any "counterrevolutionary acts" by loyalist supporters who remain in the city. Less important members of the opposition are often used on common labor projects such as preparing defenses.

60. Organizing the Defense

Organization of the defense of a city, according to Communist doctrine, is based on a thorough reconnaissance of the loyalists' strength and on the expected direction of attack. It requires also a terrain evaluation from the points of view both of defense and of the subsequent assumption of the offense. If loyalist forces are small, and if the rebels consider themselves sufficiently strong and well equipped with major weapons such as artillery and machineguns, they may plan to hold the loyalists at the city outskirts. In such a case, the rebels seek to inflict significant losses and then, by assuming the offensive, destroy the remaining loyalist force before it can break into the city. Even in such a case, however, defenses are or-

ganized within the interior of the city as a precaution against possible reverses.

a. Outer Defenses.

- (1) The outer defensive belt is organized as soon as the loyalists' strength and the probable direction of their main attack are known. A system of strong points is established and manned immediately outside the city beyond the belt. Its purpose is to require the enemy to deploy major forces. He thus discloses the direction of his main attack and is delayed as much as possible. When defensive combat from these strong points cannot be continued, the rebels conduct a planned withdrawal to the outer defensive belt.
- (2) The outer belt is divided into sectors in accordance with the length of the defensive position, the terrain, and the direction of the attack (if known). Separate staffs are organized for each sector under the overall command of the city's central headquarters. Strong points and troop dispositions are organized with mutually supporting fires as well as artillery support from within the city. Each sector withholds a reserve of sufficiently strong striking forces to initiate counter-attacks.

b. Inner Defenses.

- (1) Within the city, the defense is based on the combination of firepower, counter-attacks, and the use of terrain, struc-

tures, and fortifications. Defensive works are constructed to provide maximum cover and concealment for the rebels while permitting strikes at the enemy by fire and counterattacks.

- (2) The inner city is also divided into sectors. These surround a fortified area, preferably situated on higher ground than the surrounding sectors. The main headquarters and key logistical installations are located here. Commanders of the separate sectors are held responsible for their defense. Each sector has a central strong point, or redoubt, near which the sector staff and reserve are located. After the fall of a sector and of its redoubt, all forces in that sector withdraw to the innermost fortified area. Even if all sectors fall, the rebels are expected to defend this area to the end.

c. Barricades. The fortification of sectors consists primarily of constructing strong barricades across all streets leading toward the center of the city. Frontal and flanking firing positions are built behind the barricades. Other firing positions are prepared on roofs, in windows, and on balconies. Reconnaissance groups remain forward of the barricades to give early warning of a loyalist advance.

d. Trenches and Obstacles. Trenches are dug across streets, usually at intersections, with a width of 1 to 1.5 meters and a depth of 1.5 meters. Forward edges are revetted with pavement slabs.

As far as 50 to 70 meters in front of the trenches, entanglements are erected from materials such as barbed wire; overturned streetcars, trucks, and cars; heavy furniture; and barrels filled with sand, rocks, and any other suitable materials. Only a minimum number of riflemen remain in the trenches, which are expected to become primary targets for the loyalist artillery. The remaining forces are secretly positioned nearby, in the hope they can catch the loyalists storming the barricades in a deadly crossfire.

e. Antitank Defenses.

- (1) If the loyalists have tanks, special defensive measures are taken. Rebel infantrymen attack tanks with recoilless weapons or field expedients such as "Molotov cocktails," high explosives, or strings of hand grenades. In addition, several rows of camouflaged tank traps may be dug through the street in front of barricades. These should be about 3 meters across and 3 to 4 meters deep. Their walls are made as steep as possible.
- (2) If there is sufficient time, rebels construct tank traps with covers capable of supporting normal vehicular traffic. If possible, these are set up at night at secret locations. In general, the rebels believe that even if they lack antitank artillery, they can combat enemy armor if necessary training is provided in the use of the weapons on hand and full advantage is taken of them.

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MAAG (2)
Mil Msn (2)
USARMA (2) except
 Brazil (none)
USA Corps (1)

NG: State AG (3).

USAR: None.

For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

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